Ensuring Cyber-Security in Smart Railway Surveillance with SHIELD by DELLI PRISCOLI, Francesco et al.
   
  
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
Int. J. Critical Computer-Based Systems, Vol. X, No. Y, xxxx 1
   
 
   Copyright © 20XX Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
Ensuring cyber-security in smart railway surveillance 
with SHIELD 
Francesco Delli Priscoli and 
Alessandro Di Giorgio* 
University of Rome La Sapienza, 
Via Ariosto 25, Rome, Italy 
Email: dellipriscoli@dis.uniroma1.it 
Email: digiorgio@dis.uniroma1.it 
*Corresponding author 
Mariana Esposito 
Ansaldo STS, 
Via Argine 425, Naples, Italy 
Email: mariana.esposito@ansaldo-sts.com 
Andrea Fiaschetti 
University of Rome La Sapienza, 
Via Ariosto 25, Rome, Italy 
Email: fiaschetti@dis.uniroma1.it 
Francesco Flammini 
Ansaldo STS, 
Via Argine 425, Naples, Italy 
Email: francesco.flammini@ansaldo-sts.com 
Silvano Mignanti 
University of Rome La Sapienza, 
Via Ariosto 25, Rome, Italy 
Email: mignanti@dis.uniroma1.it 
Concetta Pragliola 
Ansaldo STS, 
Via Argine 425, Naples, Italy 
Email: concetta.pragliola@ansaldo-sts.com 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
2 F. Delli Priscoli et al. 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
Abstract: Modern railways feature increasingly complex embedded computing 
systems for surveillance that are moving towards fully wireless smart-sensors. 
Those systems are aimed at monitoring system status from a physical-security 
viewpoint, in order to detect intrusions and other environmental anomalies. 
However, the same systems used for physical-security surveillance are 
vulnerable to cyber-security threats, since they feature distributed hardware and 
software architectures often interconnected by ‘open networks’, like wireless 
channels and the internet. In this paper, we show how the integrated approach 
to security, privacy and dependability (SPD) in embedded systems provided by 
the SHIELD framework (developed within the EU funded pSHIELD and 
nSHIELD research projects) can be applied to railway surveillance systems in 
order to measure and improve their SPD level. SHIELD implements a layered 
architecture (node, network, middleware and overlay) and orchestrates SPD 
mechanisms based on ontology models, appropriate metrics and composability. 
The results of prototypical application to a real-world demonstrator show the 
effectiveness of SHIELD and justify its practical applicability in industrial 
settings. 
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1 Introduction 
Embedded systems (ES) employed in cyber-physical monitoring and control  
applications feature increasingly complex (i.e., large, distributed, heterogeneous) 
architectures and strict requirements about security, privacy and dependability (SPD). In 
order to manage such complexity, it is essential to develop new frameworks allowing the 
management of SPD requirements in a way that is both effective and efficient. Several 
research efforts have been performed to address the resilience of ES through 
hardware/software fault/attack-tolerance and dynamic reconfiguration; however, none of 
those approaches address the overall issue in a way that is integrated, cohesive and 
holistic, using semantic modelling, ontologies and control systems theories implemented 
through appropriate middleware and SPD-technologies, that is the scope of the SHIELD 
framework presented in this paper (see references Esposito et al., 2013; Delli Priscoli  
et al., 2012a; pSHIELD Project, http://pshield.unik.no/wiki/PSHIELD-public; nSHIELD 
Project, http://www.newshield.eu/.). 
Among the critical applications of ES, there are the ones addressing physical security 
that is the protection against intentional attacks of malicious nature like thefts, sabotage, 
terrorism, etc. The issue is very relevant in the context of critical infrastructure  
security (e.g., Casola et al., 2012b; Canale et al., 2012), where large, distributed and 
heterogeneous surveillance systems are employed (Flammini, 2011; Di Giorgio and 
Liberati, 2011). Those systems are used to monitor the environment to detect physical 
threats and activate appropriate response countermeasures. As a matter of fact, the same 
ES used for physical security monitoring can be subject to cyber-security attacks aimed at 
deactivating or spoofing intrusion detection and access control devices, or at getting 
private information about user data or video footage. 
One of the nowadays most relevant domains of critical infrastructure protection is 
railway and mass-transit surveillance, since for their nature (open systems moving a very 
large number of passengers) rail-based transit systems are attractive targets for 
adversaries ranging from thieves to terrorists (Hartong et al., 2008). In fact, there has 
been a growing interest of railway operators in physical security information 
management systems (Bocchetti et al., 2009) (see Figure 1), as well as in novel smart-
sensing platforms (Flammini et al., 2010; Hodge et al., 2015). Unfortunately, most of the 
sensors nowadays available for railway surveillance feature weak information security 
and resilience mechanisms (if any), that are difficult to measure, integrate and control, 
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especially considering the requirements of easy scalability, expansion and maintainability 
requested by the end users. 
Figure 1 A control room for the physical security information management (see online version 
for colours) 
 
 
The scope of this paper is to present the general features of the SHIELD framework and 
to show an example case-study application to the cyber-security of a network of smart 
wireless devices used to monitor a critical railway asset. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and its sub-sections provide a 
general description of the SHIELD framework, focusing on metrics, semantic models, 
middleware architecture and composability mechanisms. Section 3 and its sub-sections 
describe the railway security demonstrator, its reference architecture, the involved 
SHIELD prototypes, the case-study scenario, and demonstration results. Finally,  
Section 4 provides conclusions and hints about future developments. 
2 The SHIELD framework 
In recent years, ES technologies have seen an exponential diffusion in our daily life, from 
business environment to personal entertainment, mainly due to the high availability of 
low-cost computational capabilities. 
The pervasive presence of ES has therefore raised new challenges and problems that 
need to be properly addressed through strategic initiatives. In this perspective, the 
European Commission, within the seventh framework program (FP7) has established the 
ARTEMIS JU (today known as ECSEL), a joint undertaking in charge of defining and 
implementing a roadmap that will drive the growth of ESs industry towards really 
effective objectives (ECSEL JU, http://www.ecsel-ju.eu/). One of these objectives is the 
development of new technologies and/or strategies to address SPD in the context of ESs, 
with major impacts on all those applications involving safety, reliability and security. 
To properly address this challenge, a restricted pool of academic and industrial 
researchers has created the SHIELD roadmap, whose output was the SHIELD 
Framework, an innovative methodology to address SPD in complex system as a ‘built in’ 
feature, rather than ‘add-on’ functionality. 
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In a nutshell, a complex system is seen as a mixture of atomic elements performing 
specific tasks (that can be SPD relevant): the main purpose of the SHIELD methodology 
is to enable composability of these atomic functionalities. A trivial representation is 
provided in Figure 2. 
The SHIELD SPD modules can be represented as pieces of a puzzle, which perfectly 
fits each other thanks to common interfaces. Each module implements a SPD technology 
or a specific SPD functionality. As an example, in Figure 2 at node level there are two 
modules: personal node and power node technologies, at network level there are two 
functionalities: self-x algorithms and secure routing, and at middleware level there are 
two services: semantic management and authentication. 
Figure 2 SHIELD composability 
 
These modules, belonging to different SPD layers (node, network or middleware), can be 
composed statically or dynamically by the SHIELD overlay. Furthermore, individual 
SHIELD SPD modules can be replaced once the measured SPD metrics do not satisfy the 
required SPD levels. Indeed the SPD metrics are continuously monitored by the security 
agents and in case of failure, the security agent reacts by discovering, composing and 
configuring the available SPD modules. 
The SHIELD reference architecture is depicted in Figure 3 in a more formal 
representation (as already described in Fiaschetti et al., 2014, 2012), with the indication 
of the technological enablers: metrics, ontologies (or metadata) and overlay. 
The complex system is divided into its atomic elements at node (i.e., hardware), 
network (i.e., communication) and middleware (i.e., software) named ‘SPD 
functionalities’ or ‘SPD technologies’. Then, on top of that, SHIELD introduces an 
overlay of security agents which will be in charge to implement the key composability 
concept (see Figure 3). The security agents will be placed in appropriate network entities 
to be properly selected according to specific criteria which take into account the 
considered scenario. 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
6 F. Delli Priscoli et al. 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
Figure 3 SHIELD functional architecture 
 
Heterogeneous 
Measurements,
Parameters
SPD Metrics
pSHIELD
Network
Layer
pSHIELD
Middleware
Layer
SPD Security Agent
Discovery Composition
Dynamic 
context
Control 
algorithms
Rules for  
discovery 
and composition
Other SPD Security Agents
Exchanged 
metadata
pSHIELD
Overlay
Meta-
data
pSHIELD
Node
Layer
Commands for 
composition and 
configuration 
of SPD modules
 
Each security agent monitors a set of properly selected measurements and parameters 
taken at any of the three above-mentioned layers (see the arrows labelled as 
measurements in Figure 3). These heterogeneous measurements and parameters are 
converted by the security agents in homogeneous metadata by extensively using properly 
selected semantic technologies; the use of homogeneous metadata makes easy the 
metadata exchange among different security agent (Figure 3). Each security agent, thanks 
to metadata homogeneity, can aggregate the available metadata (the ones relevant to 
monitored measurements and parameters, as well as the ones coming from other security 
agents), in order to deduce aggregated metadata which form the so-called dynamic 
context. The latter is used as basic input for a set of control algorithms responsible of 
dynamically deciding which SPD modules have to be composed and enabled/disabled at 
any of the three above-mentioned layers, as well as how the activated modules have to be 
configured in order to achieve the desired SPD level. These decisions are enforced in the 
interested SPD modules lying at the three above-mentioned layers (see the arrows 
labelled as commands in Figure 3). The above-mentioned control algorithms are also in 
charge of possibly updating the rules to form the dynamic context (i.e., which 
measurements and parameters have to be monitored, which metadata have to be 
exchanged with other security agents, how the available metadata have to be aggregated, 
etc.). 
Note that the strength of the presented composability concept lies in the possibility of 
jointly deciding at the inter-layer manager, basing on information gained at all layers, 
which SPD provisions have to be performed at each layer in order to achieve the overall 
desired SPD level. This approach has the evident advantage of allowing taking SPD 
provisions which are coordinated among the different layers and of permitting to decide 
on these provisions on the basis of aggregated information coming from all layers. 
In the following sections, the main enabling technologies for this architecture will be 
described: metrics, semantic models and middleware. 
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2.1 The SHIELD metrics 
SPD metrics is the SHIELD key issue. The SHIELD project has identified static and 
dynamic SPD metrics driven by the requirements coming from applications, at each of 
the considered layers, as well as for the overall system. Then, SHIELD identifies the ES 
desired SPD level at each layer and for the overall system with respect to these metrics. 
The ‘SHIELD attack surface metrics’ is an approach developed in order to compute 
the SPD level in the SHIELD framework. The approach is an integration of three 
different methods: ‘attack surface metric’ (Manadhata and Wing, 2010), ‘the open source 
testing methodology manual (OSSTMM) 3’ (Herzog, 2010) and ‘common criteria 
evaluation methodology (CEM)’ (Common Criteria, 2012). Such integration allows 
expressing the SPD level as a plain number. 
An attack surface is a set of modes by which an attacker can entry in contact with a 
system and cause a disaster or a failure. 
The SHIELD metrics integrate dependability and security concepts. It considers the 
threat as the origin of the chain ‘fault → error → failure’ as well as the potential for 
abusing protected assets. 
The malicious human activity or non-malicious events are addressed at the entry and 
exit points of the system. The entry and exit points are characterised by three factors: 
porosity, controls, and limitations (Herzog, 2010). The characteristics of entry and exit 
points define the likelihood of being exploited by attackers. The measurement is the total 
contribution of porosity, controls and limitations. 
A threat has the capacity to subvert the security or the dependability of a system and 
in order to be effective; it shall interact directly or indirectly with the asset. So the aim is 
to separate the threat from the asset in order to avoid the interaction (e.g., total separation 
means SPD level = 100). Any protection increases the SPD level and can be activated by 
controls to the asset, in order to reduce the impact a threat. 
During the analysis phase (a sort of ‘vulnerability assessment’), it is important is to 
identify the possible interactions. This parameter is called ‘porosity’. The porosity 
reduces the separation between a threat and an access. It is characterised by three 
elements: complexity, access and trust. 
Each point of interaction (access) reduces the security and then the SPD level. The 
increase of porosity is the decrease in SPD and each pore is a complexity, access or trust. 
In detail: 
• complexity: number of SPD critical components 
• access: number of possible interactions with the system 
• trust: access not threatening system security. 
For each access pore identified, damage potential-effort ratio need to be computed to 
have a consistent measure of the introduced lack of separation. Access pores do not 
equally contribute to system porosity since they are not equally likely to be exploited by 
attackers. 
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Controls reduce the interaction between threat and assets. There are two main 
categories of controls, ‘interactive’ and ‘process’, for a total of 12 types of controls. 
Interactive Controls are directly related to complexity, access, or trust interactions, 
and they influence them. The categories are the following: 
• Authentication is a control through the challenge of credentials based on 
identification and authorisation. 
• Indemnification is a control through a contract between the asset owner and the 
interacting party. This contract may be in the form of a visible warning as a 
precursor to legal action if posted rules are not followed, specific, public legislative 
protection, or with a third-party assurance provider in case of damages like an 
insurance company. 
• Resilience is a control over all interactions to maintain the protection of assets in the 
event of corruption or failure. 
• Subjugation is a control assuring that interactions occur only according to defined 
processes. The asset owner defines how the interaction occurs which removes the 
freedom of choice but also the liability of loss from the interacting party. 
• Continuity is a control over all interactions to maintain interactivity with assets in the 
event of corruption or failure. 
Process controls define defensive processes. These controls do not directly influence 
interactions; rather, they protect the assets once the threat is present. The categories are 
the following: 
• non-repudiation is a control which prevents the interacting party from denying its 
role in any interactivity 
• confidentiality is a control for assuring an asset displayed or exchanged between 
interacting parties cannot be known outside of those parties 
• privacy is a control for assuring the means of how an asset is accessed, displayed, or 
exchanged between parties cannot be known outside of those parties 
• integrity is a control to assure that interacting parties know when assets and 
processes have changed 
• alarm is a control to notify that an interaction is occurring or has occurred. 
The classes of limitation are listed in the following: 
• vulnerability: denying access to authorised entities (people or processes), allow 
privileged access to unauthorised entities, or allowing unauthorised entities to hide 
assets or themselves 
• weakness: abusing or nullifying the effects of the interactivity controls 
• concern: disrupting or reducing the effects of the process controls 
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• exposure: unjustifiable action or error that provides direct or indirect complexity of 
targets or assets 
• anomaly: unexpected error or flaw. 
The process of obtaining the SPD level for the whole system is composed by several 
steps. The starting point is the analysis of the system and the recognition of the 
components. In order to simplify the computation and to reduce the number of system 
states, some components are merged according to SPD functionalities generated from 
their cooperation, whether they: 
• have a common physical boundary 
• could work together to identify a logical functionality. 
In this way, it is possible to apply the Attack surface metric composition rules to obtain 
all the possible SPD levels for the system. 
2.2 The SHIELD semantic framework 
As outlined in the architecture (Figure 3) and widely justified in the pilot phase of the 
project (see Fiaschetti et al., 2011; Suraci et al., 2012), the middleware modules (and 
above all the security agent) need a proper semantic framework to model and elaborate 
all the information exchanged among the system and relevant to implement the 
composability mechanism. This framework is composed by: 
• an ontology, to model technology independent information (i.e., metric value) 
• a domain database, to model technology and scenario dependent information. 
The SHIELD ontology is a simple translation of the ‘attack surface’ and ‘porosity’ 
concepts. Since the surface is a function of the amount of interfaces to the external world 
(access), interactions between components (complexity) and internal/external interactions 
with no direct impact on security (trust), these concepts are included in the ‘system’ part 
of SHIELD ontology (Figure 4). These attributes are represented by a number, so the 
generic SPD functionality brings a numeric contribution for each of these attributes. 
These values hold both for the system and for each additional SPD functionality. 
As described in the previous section, each vulnerability, identified by the number of 
‘accesses’, can be counteracted by means of specific controls. Controls are classified in 
class A and class B, and can be translated into ontology as well (Figure 4). 
Each SPD functionality brings into the system one or more controls. Each control, 
once activated, can be affected by a set of limitations that are included in the third section 
of the SHIELD ontology (Figure 4). 
Each element depicted in this ontology can be: 
• a simple number (i.e., two integrity controls, …) 
• an element itself (i.e., CRC control, hash integrity control, …). 
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Figure 4 SHIELD ontology (see online version for colours) 
 
The resulting XML file is reported in Figure 5 and, due to the very high-level information 
represented; its size is surprisingly small: about 2 kB that is suitable for low resource 
environments. 
Each SHIELD component/device can implement a set of SPD functionalities, 
introducing controls, limitations, vulnerabilities and all those information are stored into 
an XML file. 
When all the XML files are collected by the security agent, they are put together to 
build one single XML file representing the security level of the overall system. This 
composition has to cope with: 
• interfaces 
• contracts 
• exceptions. 
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Figure 5 Sample SHIELD XML (see online version for colours) 
<metrics> 
<vulnerabilities> 
<basic>0</basic> 
<e_basic>0</e_basic> 
<moderate>0</moderate> 
<high>1</high> 
<beyond_high>1</beyond_high> 
</vulnerabilities> 
<limitations> 
<anomalies>2</anomalies> 
<concerns>4</concerns> 
<exposures>1</exposures> 
<weaknesses>6</weaknesses> 
</limitations> 
<classA> 
<authentication>14</authentication> 
<indemnification>1</indemnification> 
<resilience>4</resilience> 
<subjugation>29</subjugation> 
<continuity>4</continuity> 
</classA> 
<classB> 
<non_Repudiation>11</non_Repudiation> 
<confidentiality>2</confidentiality> 
<privacy>1</privacy> 
<integrity>3</integrity> 
<alarm>6</alarm> 
</classB> 
<complexity>4</complexity> 
<trust>6</trust> 
<accessesList> 
<dp>4</dp> 
<ef>2</ef> 
<num>1</num> 
</accessesList> 
<accessesList> 
<dp>4</dp 
<ef>4</ef> 
<num>2</num> 
</accessesList> 
<SPD>84.95</SPD> 
</metrics> 
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Since those information are strictly linked to the current environment and  
operating domain, it is reasonable to find the composition information and rules in the 
domain database. The role of the domain database (or library) is to tailor the  
technology-independent information to the specific application scenario. 
This library contains all the refinements necessary to tailor the abstract components to 
the specific scenario requirements, as well as to perform metrics composition. In 
particular, it contains: 
• a replica of the XML information (relevant for metrics computation) 
• a list of numerical values for the metrics attribute of the defined ontology 
• a list of functional dependencies between the SPD functionalities (mutual inclusion 
and mutual exclusion) 
• a list of connection interfaces (i.e., topological information) to identify internal and 
external interfaces after elements coupling 
• a ‘composition priority’ attribute indicating the order in which different elements 
should be composed. 
The E-R representation of this DB is reported in Figure 6 (in yellow the parts that can 
override the information already included in the XML ontology). 
Figure 6 SHIELD domain dependent library E-R diagram (see online version for colours) 
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This library can be also referred to as ‘context’ and it is used by the overlay during the 
composition process in this way: 
Step 1 At first the ontologies (XML) are retrieved by means of discovery services. 
Step 2 Ontologies (XML) are updated by means of context information. 
Step 3 According to functional dependencies (inclusion/exclusion) only compatible 
SPD functionalities are considered for composition. The SPD functionalities 
may also be forced or deleted by proper, domain dependent, policies (i.e., a 
policy may force ciphering). 
Step 4 Following a priority order given by the priority field, individual XMLs are 
couples iteratively, to derive a single XML file starting from two atomic files. 
The result is then coupled with another atomic XML, or with an XML resulting 
from a previous coupling. The process is repeated until only one XML is 
obtained, that reports the information about the whole system. The composition 
rules for the quantification of the resulting metric value are reported in the 
following page. 
Step 5 The resulting file contains a certain amount of possible ‘variation’ of the metrics 
relevant parameters (e.g., n vulnerabilities, m weakness, and so on). By varying 
these values from 1 to m or from 1 to n, all the possible condition in which the 
system may operate are identified, with the associated metric value. The 
conditions are named ‘states’. The states may also be forced or deleted by 
proper, domain dependent, policies (i.e., a policy may remove all the states 
involving ciphering). The possible solutions for the composition problem are 
then identified. 
Step 6 At runtime, according to the current condition of the system, the solution for the 
composability problem is computed. 
The rules of metrics composition are used to determine the value of the SPD level for a 
system (scenario) in a given state, once calculated the SPD level that the various 
components (prototypes) that constitute it can take (for each state of the prototype). 
At this purpose, first of all, starting on system (scenario) architecture, it is necessary 
to define by successive steps how the various components (prototypes) are connected 
physically creating the elements and/or sub-systems, until all join in the composition of 
the system (scenario) proposed. 
The starting points for this calculation are the XML file that each prototype provides. 
Therefore, once defined the basic rules for the composition of two files associated with 
the two prototypes is possible to automate these rules for the calculation of SPD levels 
defined in the XML file that represent the various states of the system from those of the 
components (prototypes) that constitute it. 
In Tables 1 to 3, composition rules for each field of the XML file are reported, with 
the rationale for each of them and notes to handle exceptions. 
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Table 1 Porosity composition rules 
Element Composition 
rule Rationale Notes 
Complexity Sum Must consider all critical 
elements which failure 
might not be tolerated by 
system architecture 
If the same element is critical for 
more than one component, it must 
be considered only once. 
If a single component has more than 
one critical element, it must be 
considered as 1 in the composition. 
Access Sum (for the 
different 
types) 
Must consider all possible 
accesses to the composition 
of components 
If one access is common to both 
components, it must be considered 
as 1. 
If one access of the first component 
belongs also to other components 
and it is internal to the composition 
of components (with a relationship 
of trust), then these accesses must 
not be considered and the Trust 
element must be incremented by 
one. 
Trust Sum Must consider each 
relationship that exists 
where the system accepts 
interaction from its 
components or from another 
system 
If one access of the first component 
belongs also to other components 
and it is internal to the composition 
of components (with a relationship 
of trust), then these accesses must 
not be considered and the Trust 
element must be incremented by 
one. 
Table 2 Controls composition rules 
Element Composition rule Rationale Notes 
Confidentiality Sum (for the different 
control categories) 
Must consider all 
controls that counteract 
threats and their effects. 
 
Privacy 
Authentication 
Resilience 
Integrity 
Non-repudiation 
Subjugation 
Continuity 
Indemnification 
Alarm 
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Table 3 Limitations composition rules 
Element Composition 
rule Rationale Notes 
Exposure Sum Must consider all unjustifiable 
actions, flaws, or errors providing 
direct or indirect visibility of targets 
or assets within the chosen scenario 
interface 
If the same element 
represent an exposure for 
more than one component, 
it must be considered only 
once 
Vulnerability Sum (for the 
different 
rating) 
Must consider all possible flaws or 
errors that: 
 
a deny access to assets for 
authorised people or processes 
b allow privileged access to assets 
to unauthorised entities 
c allows unauthorised entities to 
hide assets or themselves 
Weakness Sum Must consider all possible flaws or 
errors that disrupt, reduce, abuse, or 
nullify the effects of the five 
interactivity controls: authentication, 
indemnification, resilience, 
subjugation, and continuity 
 
Concern Sum Must consider all possible flaws or 
errors that disrupt, reduce, abuse, or 
nullify the effects of the flow or 
execution of the five process 
controls: non-repudiation, 
confidentiality, privacy, integrity, and 
alarm. 
 
Anomaly Sum Must consider all unidentifiable or 
unknown elements which cannot be 
accounted for in normal operations, 
generally when the source or 
destination of the element cannot be 
understood. 
If more than one 
component considers the 
same anomaly, it must be 
counted only once 
2.3 The SHIELD middleware 
Figure 7 depicts the reference nSHIELD middleware and overlay architecture that is the 
software layer in charge of implementing the services necessary to perform the discovery 
(Casola et al., 2012a) and composition of SPD functionalities. 
The security agent is the core of the SHIELD system, since it implements the control 
algorithms that drive the composability. Expandability of such framework is obtained by 
enabling communication between security agents controlling different sub-systems 
through a proper overlay interface. Therefore, the presence of more than one SPD 
security agents is justified by the need for solving scalability issues in the scope of 
system-of-systems (exponential growth of complexity can be overcome only by adopting 
a hierarchical policy of divide et impera). 
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Figure 7 SHIELD middleware and overlay 
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Figure 8 Security agent architecture 
 
 
A zoom on the internal architecture of the security agent is provided in Figure 8: 
• The monitoring engine is in charge to interface the Overlay layer with the 
Middleware layer, to retrieve sensed metadata from heterogeneous SHIELD devices 
belonging to the same subsystem, to aggregate and filter the provided metadata and 
to provide the subsystem situation status to the context engine. 
• The context engine is in charge to keep the situation updated as well as to store and 
keep updated any additional information exchanged with other SPD security agents 
that are meaningful to keep track of the situation context of the controlled SHIELD 
subsystem. The situation context contains both status information and configuration 
information (e.g., rules, policies, constraints, etc.) that are used by the decision 
maker engine. 
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• The decision maker engine uses the valuable, rich input provided by the  
context engine to apply a set of adaptive (closed-loop or rule-based) and  
technology-independent algorithms. The latter, by using (as input) the  
above-mentioned situation context and by adopting appropriate advanced 
methodologies able to profitably exploit such input, produce (as output) decisions 
aiming at guaranteeing, whenever it is possible, target SPD levels over the controlled 
SHIELD subsystem. 
• The decisions mentioned above are translated by the enforcement engine into a set of 
proper enforcement rules actuated by the SHIELD middleware layer all over the 
SHIELD subsystem controlled by the considered SPD security agent. 
2.4 How does composability work in five steps 
Summing up all the concepts described so far, the SPD composability can be achieved 
through several simple steps. The first step is depicted in Figure 9. 
Figure 9 Shield ontology rationale (see online version for colours) 
 
 <?xml version="1.0"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF  
[…] 
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#" 
     xml:base="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl" 
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
     xmlns:owl2xml="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/owl2-xml#" 
     xmlns:xsp="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/2005/08/07/xsp.owl#" 
     xmlns:Ontology1300273978="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#" 
     xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
     xmlns:TCP="&Ontology1300273978;TCP/"> 
    <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
        <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://protege.stanford.edu/plugins/owl/protege"/> 
    </owl:Ontology> 
     
    <!--  
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Object Properties 
    // 
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     --> 
     
    <!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/2005/08/07/xsp.owl#minExclusive --> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&xsp;minExclusive"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&rdfs;Datatype"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#HasAutorization --> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="#HasAutorization"/> 
    […] 
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<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#" 
     xml:base="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl" 
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
     xmlns:owl2xml="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/owl2-xml#" 
     xmlns:xsp="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/2005/08/07/xsp.owl#" 
     xmlns:Ontology1300273978="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#" 
     xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
     xmlns:TCP="&Ontology1300273978;TCP/"> 
    <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
        <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://protege.stanford.edu/plugins/owl/protege"/> 
    </owl:Ontology> 
     
    <!--  
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Object Properties 
    // 
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     --> 
     
    <!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/2005/08/07/xsp.owl#minExclusive --> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&xsp;minExclusive"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&rdfs;Datatype"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#HasAutorization --> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="#HasAutorization"/> 
    […] 
 
 <?xml version="1.0"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF  
[…] 
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#" 
     xml:base="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl" 
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
     xmlns:owl2xml="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/owl2-xml#" 
     xmlns:xsp="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/2005/08/07/xsp.owl#" 
     xmlns:Ontology1300273978="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#" 
     xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
     xmlns:TCP="&Ontology1300273978;TCP/"> 
    <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
        <owl:imports rdf:resource="h tp: /protege.stanford.edu/plugins/owl/protege"/> 
    </owl:Ontology> 
     
    <!--  
    //////////////////////////////////////////////////// ////////////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Object Properties 
    // 
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     --> 
     
    <!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/2005/08/07/xsp.owl#minExclusive --> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&xsp;minExclusive"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&rdfs;Datatype"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1300273978.owl#HasAutorization --> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="#HasAutorization"/> 
    […] 
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In the SHIELD system, the security agent needs a mean to have both qualitative and 
quantitative information about system elements needing to be composed. The SHIELD 
ontology is stored into an XML file that contains the translation of the ‘attack surface 
metric’. 
The assumption is that a system expert fills in a sheet containing all the information 
needed to compute the attack surface metric. These sheets are then translated into XML 
(in order to ease information storage and parsing) and stored into a local memory of the 
component or on a remote SHIELD ontology repository accessible through the internet 
using a specific uniform resource identifier (URI) [in this respect, recent advancements in 
the future internet field might prove useful (Delli Priscoli et al., 2012b; Bruni et al., 
2016)]. 
In the second step (depicted in Figure 10), the SHIELD System is deployed into a 
specific application scenario, with the aim of implementing some security related  
end-to-end behaviour. As far as the elements are put in place, domain experts populate a 
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domain database with a set of information necessary to the security agent to tailor its 
decisions. In particular in this domain DB one can find: 
• Architectural/topological information related to the system deployment, with 
specific focus on: 
1 component interfaces (necessary for metric composition) 
2 composition hierarchy/order (also necessary for metric composition) 
3 functional dependencies (used by the composition engine to activate ancillary 
services). 
• Policies and constraints to drive the control action by: 
1 forcing specific system configurations under specific circumstances 
2 erasing specific system configurations from the available ones. 
Figure 10 SHIELD framework deployment (see online version for colours) 
 
 
In operating conditions, the SHIELD system is supposed to have access to several data 
sources: the XML stored into the ES (or alternatively on the ontologies repository) and 
the domain database. Those information are collected by the security agent and the 
derived data are stored into a local DB (i.e., a volatile memory of the software 
component). 
When the SHIELD framework is initialised or whenever variations in environmental 
or architectural conditions are detected, the discovery engine starts monitoring the system 
to collect the XML from the SHIELD Nodes or retrieve information from the domain 
DB. In this way, the security agents’ knows the list of all the available elements as well 
as (domain DB) their architectural dependencies and composition hierarchy. Using those 
information, it can iteratively couple the elements until a single metric value is obtained 
for the overall system. At this stage, Policies may also override or delete specific 
configurations that are not permitted. 
In case of multiple states for the same configuration, the corresponding metrics are 
computed. The result is then a vector of 1 to n elements, representing the n system 
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configurations and the corresponding metric value. This information is then propagated to 
the control algorithm module. 
Please note that, in order to prevent malicious attacks or flooding during the 
discovery process, the middleware is protected by a robust intrusion detection system. 
The computation of the SPD composition solution is a problem of choosing a 
configuration that implements the desired SPD level. This is trivial in case of single 
admissible solution, but it can be difficult in case of several possible states and 
configurations. In the SHIELD research project, several approaches have been 
investigated based on hybrid automata, coloured Petri nets, etc., with the most  
effective one being an optimisation algorithms that – given as inputs all the possible 
configurations – is able to compute the configuration that maximises or minimises an 
objective function, that is the distance between current and desired SPD levels. 
Figure 11 SHIELD discovery and ‘baseline’ composition (see online version for colours) 
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 <?xml  version="1.0 "?> 
<!DOC TYPE rdf:RDF  
[…] 
<rdf: RDF xmlns="ht tp://www.owl-o ntologies.com /Ontology1300 273978.owl#" 
     xml:base="htt p://www.owl-on tologies.com/ Ontology13002 73978.owl" 
     xmlns:rdfs="h ttp://www.w3.o rg/2000/01/rd f-schema#" 
     xmlns:owl2xml ="http://www. w3.org/2006/1 2/owl2-xml#" 
     xmlns:xsp="ht tp://www.owl-o ntologies.com /2005/08/07/x sp.owl#" 
     xmlns:Ontolog y1300273978=" http://www.ow l-ontologies.c om/Ontology13 00273978.owl# " 
     xmlns:owl="ht tp://www.w3.or g/2002/07/owl #" 
     xmlns:xsd="ht tp://www.w3.o rg/2001/XMLSc hema#" 
     xmlns:rdf="ht tp://www.w3.o rg/1999/02/22- rdf-syntax-ns #" 
     xmlns:TCP="&O ntology130027 3978;TCP/"> 
    <o wl:Ontology r df:about=""> 
        <owl:import s rdf:resourc e="http://pr otege.stanfor d.edu/plugins/ owl/protege"/ > 
    </ owl:Ontology>  
     
    <! --  
    // ///////////// ///////////// ///////////// ///////////// ///////////// ///////////// /////// 
    //  
    //  Object Prope rties 
    //  
    // ///////////// ///////////// ///////////// ///////////// ///////////// ///////////// /////// 
     --> 
     
    <! -- http://ww w.owl-ontolog ies.com/2005/0 8/07/xsp.owl# minExclusive --> 
    <o wl:ObjectProp erty rdf:abou t="&xsp;minEx clusive"> 
        <rdfs:domai n rdf:resourc e="&rdfs;Data type"/> 
    </ owl:ObjectPro perty> 
     
    <! -- http://ww w.owl-ontolog ies.com/Ontolo gy1300273978. owl#HasAutori zation --> 
    <o wl:ObjectProp erty rdf:abou t="#HasAutori zation"/> 
    [ …] 
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[…] 
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        <owl:imp orts rdf:res ource="http ://protege.s tanford.edu /plugins/owl /protege"/>  
    </owl:Ontolo gy> 
     
    <!--  
    //////////// /////////// //////////// /////////// //////////// //////////// /////////// ////// 
    // 
    // Object Pr operties 
    // 
    //////////// /////////// //////////// /////////// //////////// /////////// //////////// ////// 
     --> 
     
    <!-- http:// www.owl-onto logies.com/ 2005/08/07/x sp.owl#minE xclusive -->  
    <owl:ObjectP roperty rdf :about="&xsp ;minExclusi ve"> 
        <rdfs:do main rdf:res ource="&rdf s;Datatype"/ > 
    </owl:Object Property> 
     
    <!-- http:// www.owl-onto logies.com/ Ontology1300 273978.owl# HasAutorizat ion --> 
    <owl:ObjectP roperty rdf :about="#Has Autorizatio n"/> 
    […] 
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A second way to manage SPD composition is by using policy-based management (PBM). 
PBM works in parallel with the security agent and drives the composition according to 
pre-defined, deterministic rules that force specific system behaviour and components 
activation. The PBM solution is more suitable when safety aspects are involved, or when 
domain security is driven by reference standards. Such a dual approach is depicted in 
Figure 12. 
Once the selected configuration (i.e., solution) is computed, the composition engine 
enforces the decisions back to the system by means of: 
1 composition commands sent to SHIELD compliant nodes 
2 proper adapters, in case of legacy ES. 
The composition command is simply a list of commands to be executed in order to 
activate services or HW configurations. The mapping between the domain command and 
the security agent high-level decisions is reported in the domain database: for example, if 
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the SHIELD system has to interact with a Railway server to orchestrate services, then the 
list of server commands with associated ‘services’ is stored in the domain database, so 
that the discovery engine is able to interact with them. 
Figure 12 Composition problem solution (see online version for colours) 
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3 The railway security demonstrator 
3.1 Reference architecture 
A railway security system is aimed at detecting and possibly counteracting physical 
threats like abnormal behaviours, thefts, vandalism, sabotage, etc. A railway security 
system (Bocchetti et al., 2009; Flammini, 2011) is composed by several types of devices 
including access control and intrusion detection systems, cameras and other  
smart-sensors for environmental monitoring (Figure 13). In recent years, even wireless 
and low-power smart-sensors have started to be used for their flexibility as well as unique 
and convenient features: low hardware cost, low-power draining, reduced or no cabling, 
on-board programming to provide distributed ‘intelligence’, easy to obtain mesh-network 
topologies and multi-hop routing, possible ‘plug and play’ installation (Hodge et al., 
2015). 
However, the usage of wireless smart-sensors poses novel threats to information 
security due to possible cyber-attacks to stored and transmitted data, at any link of the 
path connecting sensors to the control centre. In particular, certain buildings, namely 
‘shelters’, are especially sensible targets, since they can contain valuable and possible 
critical equipment used for signalling and telecommunications. The trackside location of 
shelters is typically far from stations and depots, hence remote and automated monitoring 
of possible cyber-physical attacks is essential. 
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Figure 13 Typical architecture of a railway security system (see online version for colours) 
 
  
 
 
 
Shelters can be equipped with sensors measuring environmental parameters, such as 
temperature, humidity, vibration, light, etc., as well as motion detection cameras used to 
detect intrusions and visually verify the consistency of other alarms. Environmental 
monitoring is important for both non-intentional and intentional (human-made) threats 
like flooding, fire/overheating, unauthorised door opening, manumissions, etc. In case of 
wireless inter-sensor communication, wireless sensor networks (WSN) messages can be 
subject to the threats affecting ‘open communication channels’ (repetition, deletion, 
insertion, re-sequencing, corruption, delay, masquerade), as defined in the CENELEC 
EN50159 standard specification for railway applications. 
The reference architecture of the demonstrator is shown in Figure 14. The 
architecture is composed by an operation control centre in which the SHIELD-
middleware server and client are installed. Alarms and SPD-state variations are managed 
by the middleware server and monitored by the operators through the middleware client. 
The demonstration scenario consists of a shelter monitoring system featuring the 
following sensor types: 
• WSN motes 
• Smart cameras. 
Those devices are vulnerable to cyber-attacks at the network level, such as black-hole 
attacks (Ramaswamy et al., 2003) and bad-mouthing attacks (Vijaya and Selvam, 2013). 
Black hole attack in a network implies that one or more malicious nodes would partially 
or fully drop data packets being routed through it causing disruptions in the normal data 
flow in the network. Malicious node advertises itself as the best route towards the sink 
node just like other sensor nodes. The sender nodes select the malicious node as their 
parent node (next in line node in the routing topology) and start forwarding their data 
packets; these data packets are then dropped. In a bad mouthing attack an attacker gives 
negative feedback on a node in order to lower or destroy its reputation. 
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Figure 14 Railway security demonstrator reference architecture (see online version for colours) 
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Figure 15 Network topology in the shelter (see online version for colours) 
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In the shelter, the following sensors are installed: 
• at the entrance, smart-cameras are installed to detect physical intrusions 
• inside the shelter, two diverse WSNs are installed: WSN_1 (in green) measures 
temperature and light, while the WSN_2 (in red) only measures temperature. 
WSN_1 and WSN_2 feature different hardware and software in order to provide diverse 
redundancy. The topology of the network is shown in Figure 15. The gateway acts as the 
link through which the information is sent to the control centre. 
3.2 Involved SHIELD prototypes 
The scenario uses the following SHIELD prototypes: 
• Middleware SHIELD (MW_SH): the software layer that implements SHIELD 
methods and mechanisms. In particular, the layer is in charge of performing the 
discovery and composability activities. 
• Reputation-based secure routing (RBSR): each node inside the WSN is equipped 
with software that enables the selection of a trusted neighbour that guarantees 
continuity of the routing service. The reputation scheme enables the exchange of 
first-hand trust evidence used as third-party information by neighbours in building 
trust relationships. 
• Policy-based management framework (PBMF): the SHIELD secure policy-based 
access control (PBAC) framework facilitates the control of access to devices and 
their resources via security policies residing on resource-rich infrastructure nodes. It 
consists of several components that run on different nodes of the nSHIELD 
architecture. These components are the policy enforcement points (PEP), the policy 
administration point (PAP), the policy decision points (PDP) and the policy 
information point (PIP). A node, depending on its capabilities and the available 
resources, might include one or more of these functional components. The solution 
adopted for secure PBAC is based on extensible access control markup language 
(XACML) policies. The PBAC framework is DPWS-compliant, utilising the relevant 
specifications and existing work to provide message-level security and fine-grained 
security policy functionality while maintaining interoperability with the standard. 
• Network security layer (NSL): this software layer allows a sensor node running 
Contiki OS to communicate with an external host (e.g., a laptop running Linux), 
using end-to-end security on the network layer. In this way, any readings from the 
sensor (e.g., temperature) are transferred via a secure communication channel using 
IPsec, based on AES-CCM (RFC 4309). Since the sensor communicates via 
6LoWPAN and the laptop via standard IPv6, another sensor is used as a bridge 
between these two technologies. Finally, the security level of this IPsec 
communication can be changed by modifying the size of the integrity check value 
(ICV). 
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• Middleware intrusion detection (MW_IDS): this module protects the middleware 
entry points from overload or blocked service situations. Overload can be caused 
either by normal requests due to some bottlenecks or delays in the system, or as a 
result of a malicious attack, due to a large number of requests or specially crafted 
requests causing the system to malfunction (DoS or DDoS attacks). The objective of 
the filtering and intrusion detection functionalities is to provide protection and safe 
recovery when one of the above types of malformed traffic occurs. 
The use of these prototypes makes the Railway Security scenario SHIELD-compliant, 
providing the SPD-enhancements of the SHIELD methodology. In particular, the aim is 
to demonstrate that: 
• the communication between nodes is secure, due to the presence of mechanisms able 
to detect cyber-security attacks and encrypt connections 
• the communication with the middleware is monitored and protected from possible 
malicious connections 
• stored and transmitted data is protected from unauthorised access 
• WSN data routes feature redundant links, with automatic detection of HW/SW node 
failures and appropriate reconfiguration. 
Figure 16 UML model of system-threats-countermeasures (see online version for colours) 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 Ensuring cyber-security in smart railway surveillance with SHIELD 25 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
In Figure 16, the role of each prototype in the demonstration scenario is defined by means 
of a UML class diagram. 
The MW_IDS prototype is installed at the middleware level and it is able to 
counteract malicious requests/intrusions against the middleware. The PBMF is installed 
on specific nodes (in this case on the smart-camera) to detect intrusions at node level. The 
NSL is a cryptographic protocol installed at the node level, in this case on a WSN, to 
encrypt the information exchanged between nodes. The RBSR is installed at the node 
level, in this case on a WSN, to detect malicious threats such as bad mouthing attacks, 
black hole attacks and node failures, and to restore system operation by reconfiguring the 
routing among nodes. 
Figure 17 Thresholds of SPD level (see online version for colours) 
HIGH (SPD >= 0.7) 
NORMAL (0.3 < SPD < 0.7) 
LOW (0.2 ≤ SPD ≤ 0.3) 
VERY LOW (0 < SPD < 0.2) 
3.3 Scenario description 
The aim of the scenario is to show the effectiveness of SHIELD prototypes, middleware 
and metrics in the specific application, by counteracting cyber-attacks and properly  
re-configuring the system in case of failures. Figure 18 shows the scenario description 
using a UML sequence diagram, while Figure 19 reports the UML state diagram 
representing the system during scenario execution. 
In the sequence diagram, the actors involved in the scenario are represented. On each 
message, a railway scenario state (RSS) code is indicated. This code identifies the state 
of the system. Table 4 shows the steps of scenario and the associated SPD metrics. At 
each step, one or more components change their status and the related SPD value  
(red text in Table 4) changes accordingly. For each step, it is possible to identify the state 
of the system and the state of the single prototypes during scenario execution. 
Furthermore, the column ‘SPD norm’ shows a normalised SPD value between 0  
(lowest relative SPD) and 1 (highest relative SPD). The colour indicates a qualitative 
SPD level. 
In fact, the SPD levels derived from SHIELD metrics are expressed by plain numbers 
(e.g., 84.705) since they are the results of mathematical formulas. In order to make the 
SPD level easier to understand and hence to ease situation awareness for operatora, a 
normalisation of the SPD level between 0 (lowest relative SPD) and 1 (highest relative 
SPD) has been performed and reported in the column ‘SPD normalised value’. 
The formula applied for normalisation is the following: 
min
max min
act
norm
SPD SPDSPD
SPD SPD
−
=
−
 
where SPD_min (resp. SPD_max) is the minimum (resp. maximum) SPD level, while 
SPD_act is the actual SPD level (i.e., the one computed by the middleware). 
The associated reference thresholds are reported in Figure 17. 
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The system starts from a basic SPD configuration when no threats are detected. In 
order to save smart-sensor node resources, prototypes are configured with basic SPD 
functionalities and default SPD levels. The state of prototypes is changed in response to 
attacks, in order to guarantee adequate SPD levels during system operation. 
Figure 18 Scenario UML sequence diagram 
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Figure 19 Scenario UML state diagram (see online version for colours) 
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Table 4 Scenario steps (see online version for colours) 
Step Description RSS SPD 
norm 
1 Initialisation of all systems and activation of discovery service to 
register available nodes and prototypes. Basic security functionalities. 
State_01 0.3 
WSN_1: normal 
WSN_2: encryption 64 bits 
Smart camera: messaging – no protection 
DW_IDS: normal 
2 In WSN_1, a bad mouthing attack is detected. The middleware is 
informed of the attack is ongoing so it sends a command to the smart 
camera to activate its security mechanisms. SPD level decreases. 
State_03 0 
WSN_1: bad mouthing attack 
WSN_2: encryption 64 bits 
Smart camera: messaging – no protection 
MDW_IDS: normal 
3 Smart-camera activates its SPD functionality. SPD level increases. State_19 0.3 
WSN_1: bad mouthing attack 
WSN_2: encryption 64 bits 
Smart camera: messaging – authentication and integrity 
MDW_IDS: normal 
4 The WSN_1 has counteracted the bad mouthing attack. SPD level 
increases again. 
State_17 0.6 
WSN_1: normal 
WSN_2: encryption 64 bits 
Smart camera: messaging – authentication and integrity 
MDW_IDS: normal 
5 In WSN_1, a black hole attack is detected. The middleware is 
informed of the attack so it sends a command to the smart-camera and 
WSN_2 to activate their security mechanisms. SPD level decreases. 
State_18 0.3 
WSN_1: black hole attack 
WSN_2: encryption 64 bits 
Smart camera: messaging – authentication and integrity 
MDW_IDS: normal 
6 The smart-camera and WSN_2 have activated their security 
functionalities. SPD level increases 
State_42 0.6 
WSN_1: black hole attack 
WSN_2: encryption 128 bits 
Smart camera: authentication, integrity and confidentiality 
MDW_IDS: normal 
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Table 4 Scenario steps (continued) (see online version for colours) 
Step Description RSS SPD 
norm 
7 The WSN_1 has counteracted the black hole attack. SPD level 
increases again. 
State_41 1 
WSN_1: normal 
WSN_2: encryption 128 bits 
Smart camera: authentication, integrity and confidentiality 
MDW_IDS: normal 
8 In WSN_1, a node failure is detected. The SPD level decreases. State_45 0.8 
WSN_1: dead node alarm 
WSN_2: encryption 128 bits 
Smart camera: authentication, integrity and confidentiality 
MDW_IDS: normal 
9 WSN_1 recovers from node failure. SPD level increases. State_41 1 
WSN_1: normal 
WSN_2: encryption 128 bits 
Smart camera: authentication, integrity and confidentiality 
MDW_IDS: normal 
10 A DoS attack against middleware is detected. SPD level decreases. State_89 0.8 
WSN_1: normal 
WSN_2: encryption 128 bits 
Smart camera: authentication, integrity and confidentiality 
MDW_IDS: IDS alarm 
11 End of DoS attack. SPD level increases. State_41 1 
WSN_1: normal 
WSN_2: encryption 128 bits 
Smart camera: authentication, integrity and confidentiality 
MDW_IDS: normal 
3.4 Demonstration results 
The demonstration has proven that the SHIELD system is able to control systemSPD 
level during the simulated scenario by detecting threats (i.e., attacks and faults) and 
activating the appropriate countermeasures provided by the installed SHIELD prototypes. 
That allows fulfilling the customer requirements often referred to as ‘resilience’ or  
‘self-healing’. 
Figure 20 shows the variation of the SPD Level during scenario execution in the 
testing environment shown in Figure 21. The SPD level starts with a value of 84.22 and 
then decreases/increases depending on the events that are happening and on the 
countermeasures activated by SHIELD, according to the steps described in Table 4. 
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Figure 20 Variation of the SPD level in the demonstration scenario (see online version  
for colours) 
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Figure 21 SHIELD testing environment for the railway security scenario (see online version  
for colours) 
 
The demonstrator validated the correct integration and interoperability among SHIELD 
components at all levels: middleware and overlay, network and node. The  
SPD-level output provided in Figure 20 is exactly what was expected: it was the result of 
SPD-level variations generated by the information passed to the middleware by all 
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SHIELD components, with decreases caused by some external events, to which the 
SHIELD system reacts raising the SPD level. 
Please note that the final state of the system features a higher SPD-level with respect 
to the initial one, since more SPD mechanisms have been kept activated in response to 
the threats detected in the previous steps. Such a ‘self-adaptation’ to the ‘risks’ detected 
in the surrounding environment is something that is highly beneficial to end users, since 
typical risk assessment is an error prone static activity, that would need to be repeated 
after some time to redesign the security policies, costing significant time and resources. 
Figure 21 shows a screenshot of the PC running the middleware and overlay 
components, including the secure discovery, the security agent, the intrusion detection 
module, the OSGi middleware, the semantic model, and the control algorithms. The 
screenshot has been taken during the final nSHIELD project demonstration held in 
Nerviano (Selex ES premises) on 21 January 2015. 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have described the SHIELD approach to ensure cyber-security in 
railway monitoring and surveillance applications, that are based on increasingly smart 
embedded devices (environmental sensors and cameras). 
The railway security demonstrator has showed a subset of SHIELD functionalities, 
focusing on the security mechanisms enabled by the involved prototypes. The SHIELD 
framework has been developed in the context of two EU funded multi-year  
research projects [namely pilot-SHIELD (pSHIELD Project, http://pshield.unik.no/wiki/ 
PSHIELD-public) and new-SHIELD (pSHIELD Project, http://pshield.unik.no/wiki/ 
PSHIELD-public0]) and it is general enough to address a large number of other possible 
applications in very different domains. For instance, the new-SHIELD research project 
demonstration also addressed avionics and social mobility. 
We believe the results of the SHIELD project have paved the way to a completely 
new approach to address the development and control of SPD functionalities, leveraging 
and integrating the state-of-the-art of current multidisciplinary research in contexts like: 
hybrid control, semantic modelling, service oriented architectures, computer 
dependability, critical infrastructure resilience, self-healing and reconfiguration, 
information security metrics, smart-devices and WSN. Those theoretically outstanding 
achievements need to be supported by the actual industrialisation of SHIELD-compliant 
devices that is still in progress. Commercial off the shelf (COTS) SHIELD-compliant 
devices will allow the SPD-aware composition of heterogeneous devices that will 
seamlessly integrate to provide dynamic SPD measurement and resilience functionalities. 
In railway applications, that allows improving the SPD and shortening the  
time-to-market of all ‘non-vital’ (i.e., non-safety-critical) applications, while for the 
‘vital’ ones, a certification process of the framework components will be necessary in 
order to match the CENELEC requirements for higher safety integrity levels (SIL). 
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